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AMERICAN PROGRESS IN JURISPRUDENCE.*
The history of a nation's movements, material or moral, in
a given period, would be incomplete without some account of
the development of its laws. The legislation of a people,
made with deliberation and duly enforced, is after all the best
index of its advancement or retrogression.
Having been requested to prepare for the Columbian Exposition, some account of the progress in jurisprudence made
by the United States, I had undertaken to do so, when the
admirable address of Professor Baldwin, of Yale, delivered in
July last before the Bar Association of Ohio, fell into my
hands, and I found there the work already in great part done.
Little remains for me but to group together the principal facts
which Professor Baldwin has given in greater detail, and to
add some observations on what I must consider certain steps
of retrogression.
All the world knows that for more than a century that part
of the newly-discovered hemisphere, which is now occupied by
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the United States, remained a wilderness over which roamed
only savage tribes. That there had been prehistoric races,
the mounds of the west and other vestiges bear witness, but
the early part of the seventeenth century saw the beginning
of settlements by Europeans. The first comers were English, French and Spaniards. They brought with them, of
course, the laws of their respective countries. The predominant element in population and in law was English, and so
continued up to the last half of the eighteenth century.
From that time an American element began to develop itself.
Of what preceded that development it is unnecessary to speak
here.
We began with asserting the sovereignty of the people.
This was done by the Declaration of Independence in 1776.
What is meant by sovereignty? The right to make and
unmake forms of government. Not the power to enact
statutes, for that is usually delegated to legislative assemblies. The formula for enactments in New York expresses
the general principle: "The People of the State of New York
represented in Senate and Assembly do enact as follows."
Sovereignty in a political society is the supreme power, a
power from which there is no appeal. In our country this
supreme power is divided between the Union and the States,
but so much of it as has been given to the former was given
by the latter. The result is, that Congress is not sovereign,
nor is the President sovereign, nor is the Judiciary sovereign;
nor, indeed, are all three combined sovereign. They may
exercise their part of the sovereign power, but it is only by
delegation that they exercise it at all. On the other hand, the
reserved powers are all with the separate States, so that we
have, in fact, a divided sovereignty, but none the less is it true,
that sovereignty in this country resides with the people,
partly in all the states united, and partly in the several states
-- "E pluribus unum."
What is meant by the people? At the time of the great
Declaration, the people meant adult white men. After the
civil war. and for some years, the people meant adult men,
white or black. What is meant now? In the State of Wyo-
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ming, by the people is meant adult men and women, white or
black. In that most advanced of all the states in this respect,
a woman as well as a man votes for the representatives of the
people. Why should she not? She counts in every enumeration of the census; her name is on every tax-roll ; she is
the nurser and instructor of youth; she forms more than man
the habits, tastes and manners of all the living; she is as
deeply interested as man in good laws well administered; she
suffers as much from bad administration and profits as much
by a good one. I repeat, why should she not vote as well as
men? Certainly, it is not because she is not as capable to
rule. In modern times, three of the greatest rulers of the
world have been women: Maria Theresa of Austria, Catherine of Russia, and Victoria of England. It does not become
a man to say that any one of these great personages was not,
at least, his equal in the capacity and art of governing. And
in these states, who will pretend that it is just and decorous
to give the right of voting to ignorant blacks, when it is
refused to intelligent women? Political and social movements are sometimes slow in their coming; but come they
will, and it is the logical sequence of our frequent saying, that
this is a government of the people, by the people and for the
people, that every true man should allow to the wife of his
bosom and the daughter of his house the same voice in the
government of their country that is allowed to his brother and
his son. For use, it is enough to say, that, though in many
states and nations the right of voting for holders of the less
important offices has been conceded to women, yet it has been
reserved to an American state to be first in the long procession of ages to place upon the head of woman as of man the
crown of a free and equal suffrage.
Following this primal and fundamental principle of sovereignty in the people, and consecrated by it, are certain rights
pronounced inherent in every human being, to be lost only for
crime: the right to life; the right to liberty; the right to
worship God as conscience dictates; the right to choose one's
home wherever he can -find it; the right to speak and write
freely; and the right to labor when, where, and for such
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reward as the laborer and his employer may agree to between
themselves.
Under the influence of these great principles, our political
system, state and national, has been built; a fabric purely
American, without precedent in the past and ready for further
development in the future.
Dividing the law into two great branches, international and
national, the United States may boast of having been the first
to establish expatriation as the right of every human being,
whatever may have been the bonds of birth or inheritance
which bound him to the soil. Next to the vassalage which
condemned the man to serve on the estate upon which he was
born, was the vassalage which bound him to the country
which gave him birth. This was one of the fetters from which,
according to the international law prevailing for many ages,
no man could free himself. Upon this monstrous theory,
seamen of foreign birth were impressed from the decks of our
merchantmen, until we became strong enough to break the
fetters; and the doctrine of perpetual allegiance so long upheld
in the old world is now hardly remembered in the new.
The United States have also done more than any other
nation toward making international arbitration a maxim of
public policy and an article of public law. Within the present
century there have been at least fifty-eight instances of arbitration between nations, in thirty-five of which the United States
were parties. They have endeavored, also, though with no
great result as yet, to bring about an agreement between the
independent states of North and South America to submit all
their differences to that manner of settlement. Good has
already come from the peaceful adjustments in which we have
participated, and greater we devoutly hope will follow. The
two strongest nations of the world are now contending at
Paris, before seven gentlemen selected for the purpose, to
settle by peaceful discussion and judgment a dispute which a
century or perhaps half a century ago would have reddened the
North Pacific with the blood of kindred nations, and threatened with fire and rapine cities and villages along the coasts of
half the world.
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Passing on to national law, in its five great departments of
organic law, the law of persons, the law of property, the law
of obligations, and the law of procedure, we are to observe, first
of all, that the United States placed their Constitution beyond
the reach of executive or legislative power. The President
may act, and the Congress may act, but the judiciary may
decide after all, whether the act is authorized by the Constitution. Never before in any constitutional government was
the organic law put under the guardianship of the judiciary.
This is a feature purely American, and of value incalculable
for the protection of individual rights.
In the category of these individual rights I conceive that the
greatest achievement ever made in the cause of human progress is the total and final separation of the state from the
church. If we had nothing else to boast of, we could claim
-ith justice that first among the nations we of this country
made it an article of organic law that the relations between
-man and his maker were a private concern into which other
men had no right to intrude. To measure the stride thus
made for the emancipation of the race, we have only to look
lback over the centuries that have gone before us, and recall
the dreadful persecutions in the name of religion which have
filled the world with horror. Think of Torquemada in Spain;
the martyrs suffering at the stake or in prison in many another
land; the exiles driven from France by the revocation of the
edict of Nantes; the "slaughtered saints, whose bones lay
-scattered on the Alpine mountains cold." Amid all our
shortcomings, it will remain forever to the glory of these
states that they allow no man to step between his fellow-man
and his maker. Clouds and darkness do indeed often seem
to cover the land; but there is one rift in the clouds through
which, to the mind's eye at least, the daylight will shine as
long as the world lasts. This nation may be torn into
fragments, or other races may occupy the land in some
era far away, but the fact will still remain that there was
a nation of free men on this continent which first rent the
shackles that priestly domination had been forging for
-centuries, and solemnly decreed that no man should
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dare intercept the radiance of the Almighty upon thehuman soul.
Besides this great act of deliverance, we have emancipated
woman from the domination of her husband; we have freed
the honest debtor from the possibility of passing his life in
prison; we have rendered it impossible for legislation to make
that act a crime which was not a crime when it was committed; we have forbidden the states to impair the obligation
of a contract between man and man; we have proclaimed from
sea to sea that all men are created equal in rights, and that
among those rights are the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; we have imbedded in the fundamental law
of the land as principles inviolable and eternal, that no man
can be deprived of these rights without due process of law,
and that all are entitled to the equal protection of the laws.
After personal rights come the rights to property; and in
respect of real property we find that the feudal system, with
all its incidents, has nearly passed away. The Colonists,
indeed, brought with them, in theory at least, that intricate
and burdensome system, as it existed in England at the time
of the emigration. But so early as 1829, a writer in the
"American Jurist" was able to publish thd following, in
respect of the changes made up to that time in one or more
of the states :
" (I) Abolition of feudal tenure, including copyhold; (2)
Abolition of tithes; (3) Making both the real and personal
property of intestates descend to the same persons ; (4)
Enabling parents to become heirs to their children; (5) Abolition of primogeniture and preference of males in descent; (6)
Making all estates descend in the same course, whether
acquired by purchase or by descent from paternal or maternal
relations; (7) Abolishing the preference of male stock in
descent; (8) Enabling half-blood relations to inherit; (9)
Making husband and wife heirs to each other in case of failure
of blood relations; (io) Miking seizin of land pass by the
mere delivery of the deed; (II)The general registration of
deeds; (12) Making a fee simple pass without the word
'heirs ' or any equivalent, where a less estate is not expressed;
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(I3) Enabling tenants in tail to convey estates in fee simple
without a fine or recovery; (14) Enabling married women to
convey their estates and bar their- dower without a fine; (15)
Change of joint tenancies into tenancies in common; (I6)
Removing the disabilities of alienage with regard to real
property; (17) Abolition of the doctrine of tacking in mortgages; (18) Placing land mortgages, as well as the debt for
which it is security, at the disposal of the mortgagee's executor; (I9) Making all real estate liable to execution for
debt, and having it sold on execution, like personal property;
(2o) Rendering real estate assets for payment of all debt without any preference; (21) Shortening the time of limitation.
"The object and effect of the changes that we have
enumerated are to render the principles of law applicable to
real property more simple and equitable; the rules of construction more conformable to common sense; the modes of
transferring it more cheap, direct and expeditious ; the title to
it more clear and easily investigated, and in consequence its
purchasers more secure."
Before this time, indeed, and in 1827, the revisers of the
New York statutes had elaborated a code of real property
which lacked but a few additions to make a complete code on
that subject. And since then many of the states have adopted
a Homestead Exemption law, the object of which is to make
every homestead a citadel against the claims of creditors.
There is in this no injustice, so long as creditors deal upon
this condition.
In the two vast domains of personal property and of personal contracts, the laws of America and England have moved
very much abreast of each other. It could hardly be otherwise, considering the ties of trade and the frequency of intercourse between the two kindred nations. The reports of
decisions in the courts of the two countries are interchanged
year by year and almost day by day. Our contingent,
according to the latest computation, amounts to 118 volumes
a year. How many volumes come over the sea, I do not
know. I can only guess at the accumulations from a publication now passing through the press, entitled "The American
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and English Encyclopedia of Law," which has already issued
twenty volumes and promises five more, boasting (what a
boast!) of-having collected. 70o,ooo decisions.
Approaching now the great department of procedure, the
key of jurisprudence, or I should rather say the key of its
temple, we find the United States first of all English-speaking
nations rejecting the cumbersome and contradictory methods
of the common law of England, which that country had been
gathering together through immemorial ages. Time-worn and
worm-eaten were those cracked, dusty parchments, on which
was written the worst contrived plan of entering the courts
and getting out of them that the wit of man could devise. In
place of the old labyrinthine ways we have laid out a plain and
easy road for all litigants with their burdens, and their witnesses.
No suitor is turned away for defect of form, and no witness is
rejected who has sense enough to think and voice enough to
speak.
We all know, or rather, I should say, all lawyers know,
that by the English common law, made by the judges, a
suitor was obliged to choose between two great divisions of
the courts, one called legal and the other equitable. If he
entered one when he should have entered the other, he lost
his suit. This was not all: the legal division was subdivided
according to what were called forms of action, and he was
required at his peril to choose one of these as his particular
form for the occasion. A royal commission in England had
reported that there was no authentic enumeration of these
forms. This grotesque machinery has been swept away,
wholly or in great part, in twenty-eight American states and
territories, New York, Missouri, Wisconsin, California, Kentucky,,Ohio, Iowa, Kansas, Nevada, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Arizona, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Wyoming, Washington, Connecticut, Indiana, Colorado, Georgia,
Utah and Maine.
The example was contagious, even so far as across the sea,
and in 1873 the Parliament of England took up the subject,
and following American example adopted the Judicature Act,
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by which the forms of action were abolished and law and
equity fused together. This act extended to Ireland, and has
been followed in the English colonies of Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, New
Zealand, Jamaica, St. Vincent, the Leeward Islands, British
Honduras, Cambria, Grenada, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland,
Ontario and British Columbia.
It was not civil procedure alone that was taken up in
America; criminal procedure, that is, procedure in the criminal
courts, was meliorated and codified. Long before this, however, and from the very beginning of American courts, the
denial of counsel to persons accused of crime had been
repudiated as a gross inhumanity.
I must not pass from this subject of advancing jurisprudence without a few words upon the form of expression which
it seems tending to assume, and that is codification. This
tendency is remarkable, and, in that respect, we have also outstripped all other English-speaking communities.
Besides the acts of civil procedure that I have mentioned,
and which I count as codes-though a few of them, like the
practice act of Maine, are couched in not more than a dozen
comprehensive and fundamental sections, to be engrafted upon
the general practice of the state-besides these acts, I repeat,
there are already to be found in American jur.isprudence 18
codes of criminal procedure, 5 penal codes and 5 general civil
codes. Taken altogether, here is an array of 56 codes which
the United States are able to present to the world as the fruit
of the first century of independence, or rather of the present
half of it.
It is not my purpose here to enter upon an argument in
favor of codification. I will not debate the question whether
judges should be makers as well as interpreters of the laws.
The controversy has been carried on with much warmth in
New York and some other states. It lies now, as it has ever
lain, between the written and unwritten law-between the
statute book and the choas of myriad precedents. Upon the
whole subject I content myself with copying two passages
from Professor Baldwin's address, two resolutions, one of the
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American Bar Association, and the other of the New York
State Bar Association, and then giving a tradition of the old
New York Bar:
"We have given, I cannot but think, an undue prominence
to judicial precedents as a natural source or annunciation of
the law. The multiplication of distinct sovereignties in the
same land, each fully officered, and each publishing in official
form the opinions of its courts of last resort, bewilders the
American lawyer in his search for authority. The guiding
principles of our law are few and plain. Their application to
the matter we may have in hand it is the business of our profession to make, and if we spent more time in doing it ourselves, and less in endeavoring to find how other men had
done it in other cases, we should, I believe, be better prepared
to inform the court and serve our client."
"The drift of American jurisprudence is towards the
expression of the law in an orderly and official form; in other
words, towards codification. It has approached the question
from the practical side, and in a practical way. The early
colonies soon put their scanty statutes into print, arranged in
some convenient way for ready reference, the various heads
often following each other in alphabetical order, as in our
digests of reports. New York led the way towards a more
systematic and comprehensive treatment of the subject, by her
Revised Statutes of 1827, a revision which, though in many
points revolutionary, was so well considered and well done
that it has held the ground for over half a century, while in
most of our states revision succeeds revision every ten or
fifteen years. But there is nothing distinctively American in
codification. It is simply un-English. It is the natural aim
and end of every system of jurisprudence-of jurisprudence
itself, apart from any particular system of it. Jurisprudence
is the scence of law, and the orderly statement of its rules
can be called by no better name than Code."
At its annual meeting in 1886, the American Bar Association, after full dicussion, adopted a resolution that " the law
itself should be reduced, so far as its substantial principles
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are settled, to the form of a statute;" and in 1892 the New
York State Bar Association by resolution expressed its regret
that no action had been taken in the last preceding Legislature
toward the enactment of the civil code and code of evidence
so long pending. A great lawyer, but subsequently discredited statesman, in the beginning of our century, when
asked for a definition of the law, was wont to reply, according to the tradition, "That which is speciously proposed and
plausibly maintained, that is the law." Was he not right?
The foregoing is a sketch, and but a sketch, of what I call
our advancement in jurisprudence. I have avoided questions
of morals, or tastes, or manners, and have refrained from
enquiring how far, if at all, our acts have strayed from our
professions. I am discussing only the laws of the land as
they appear in our books. "I have shown the bright figures
of the shield. We are all proud of them, and, as I think,
justly proud. I wish there were no shadows there. But
shadows there are, nevertheless, from which we ought not to
turn our eyes aside, since they may prove to be the cloudy
precursors of storms. I refer to the popular election of
judges ; allowing them short terms of office, and the increasing habit of spasmodic and excessive legislation.
The Federal judges are all appointed by the President,
with the consent of the Senate, and hold their offices during
good behavior. The judges of the several states are apointed
or elected, and hold office as the constitutions of the states
severally provide. These constitutions have been so of-en
changed, that I am not sure that I can write them all down
correctly; but so far as I have the means at present of knowing, their arrangements are as follows: In 8 of the 42 states
the judges of the highest courts are appointed by the govelnors, with the consent of the Senate or a Legislature or a
Council ; in 7 they are elected by the Legislature; in 27 they
are elected by the people. In 8 of the states, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Florida and Alabama, the judges of the
highest courts hold their offices during good behavior; in 6,
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Louisiana, Tennessee
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and West Virginia, they hold for terms between Io and 15
years; in 2, Illinois and Colorado, for 9 years; in 5, Virginia,
Kentucky, Michigan, Arkansas and Wyoming, for 8 years;
in Minnesota for 7 years; in Ohio for 5 years; in Georgia for
3 years ; in all the rest for 6 years, except that Vermont elects
her judges annually by the Legislature, and Rhode Island
elects hers by the Legislature to hold during its pleasure.
Now, after reading this catalogue, let us call to mind, that
according to the dogma of the common law, and the rule of
stare decisis, every one of these judges, so appointed or so
elected, for terms long or short, makes law in some degree,
great or small, for the whole English race, which lives upon
reports, near or afar, excepting those autonomous states which
have had the courage and the wisdom to condense their laws
into codes.
In framing the judicial department of some of our states,
and particularly the new ones, we have forgotten the lessons
and departed from the practice of the statesmen who contrived our system of Federal government. This system was
but the evolution of movements that had been struggling and
swelling for ages in the mother country between the sovereign
and the people. Our fathers of the revolutionary period considered profoundly the formation of a judiciary and the best
means of securing fit occupants, and of placing them above
the reach of temptation. They understood well that the
functions of the judicial department were different from those
of the legislative or the executive. These two represent the
people, and are chosen to execute their will; the judges are
but interpreters of the law. They have nothing to do with
the will of the people, except as that will is expressed in the
laws of the land.
The problem is simply this, how to get the best judges, and
make them safe against temptation. We have but three means
of selection-a convention of the people, the Legislature, or the
chief executive. A popular convention has rarely the knowledge and frequently not the disposition to choose the fittest
lawyer for their judge. Generally the members of these conventions do not know and cannot know who that fittest.person
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is, or if they know they are apt to be swayed by personal or
party motives. If an architect or an astronomer were to be
made a public officer, who but a lunatic would think of making him elective by popular vote? We, in New York, have
had some experience of a mistake in that respect. By the
Constitution of 1846, the canals and prisons of the state were
put into the charge of two sets of officers elected by the people.
This was an object lesson easy to understand, and the power
of appointment was taken from the general body of the people
and devolved upon the governor.
A choice by the Legislature is subject to many of the objections which can be offered to a selection by popular convention, and it is subject to the further objection that it devolves
upon the Legislature functions which do not properly belong
to it. The closer a legislative body is confined to the making
of laws, and the less scope is allowed to other measures, the
better for the laws themselves.
On the other hand, a president or a governor is usually a
person of some distinction who has already shown ability and
discernment. He may, indeed, abuse his trust, and choose
the unworthy or unqualified to office, but the chances are
greater that he will make a wise choice than that'such a choice
will be made by a casual assembly of the wise and the unwise,
brought together for a day, and animated more by considerations of party than of country. We have seen in our late
President the choice of the highest judges made with wise discernment.
It is by no means true that popular election is regarded with
such favor as to be resorted to whenever an opportunity occurs
for filling the various agencies most important in the conduct
of life. The abstentions from the polls, so frequent and so
increasing of late, are proofs that the people do not, except on
occasions of great excitement, take to voting as if moved by
instinct. In 1884, one city of Massachusetts, out of 8699
voters found only 6ro8 at the polls. On subjects not political
nobody thinks of calling for a popular vote; the subject of
religion, for instance. While the citizen is, as we have seen,
left free as possible in his beliefs and religious services, the

AMERICAN

PROGRESS IN JURISPRUDENCE.

offices are filled by churchmen. In the Romish Church the
hierarchy is self-elective, from pontiff to priest; all receive their
calling from above, and the laity has as little to do with the
dignities, the emoluments and the services, as if there were
no such things. To a greater or less degree the other communions replenish the priesthood in a similar way; some
allowing all communicants to participate, and some the pewholders, and some the believers. Then turn to the secular
employments of life; run the eye over the banks, the railways,
the steamers, the manufacturing corporations, and other associations, great and small, by the work of which we build our
houses, furnish them to our several tastes, and satisfy our
wants, night and day. I do not here speak of those private
individuals who supply most of our wants, but of the enterprises, half public and half private, which are expressly authorized and controlled by the state, but not manned by it. I
mention these instances to show that popular election is not
the general rule in human society. Citizens do not necessarily
hunger and thirst for the privilege of voting. What they want
is the ultimate sovereignty and a ready means of exercising it
in case of need. This ultimate sovereign power in this republic
rests, we know, in the body of the people. That does not
signify that individuality should be crushed out, or that all
offices, or even the most of them, should be filled by popular
election. And so the only true question in respect of filling
the judicial department is whether a popular assembly is the
best device to ensure the choice of the best judges; and I
insist that it is not. The), who have read aright the history
of subservient English judges before they were made independent-they who remember the chancellor of Mississippi,
who lost his office because he decided against repudiation, and
the Supreme Court judge of Michigan, who was voted down
because he did his duty-they who thus read and remember,
can best appreciate the value of a judiciary which has nothing
to hope or fear but from the conscience of its own members.
Whilst I was writing these last words of my paper, the
Chief Justice of the United States, with two other judges, was
delivering a masterly judgment in a case involving the ques-
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tion or opening the Exposition at Chicago on Sunday. This
judgment is certain to wound the susceptibilities of a large
number of religious teachers and their disciples. If the Chief
Justice were to be a candidate for renomination by a popular
convention, is it likely that he would'receive it ? And yet his
judgment rests upon the foundation stones of this nation.
In respect of the terms of office, what can be said in favor
of short ones? None that I can discern, except that officeseekers may have a better chance of coming in for a seat
upon the bench, however transitory, and a salary, however
small. How can a judge feel that independence which is his
right and the right as well as of all within his jurisdiction,
unless he can say, if need be, to a. disappointed suitor or a
displeased and surging crowd, " I judge according to my conscience; do your worst? " It is sometimes suggested that
the people like to see a judge serve a sort of probation before
entrusting him with enduring office. But a judge on probation would be a queer spectacle. We know, indeed, that
the wisest are sometimes disappointed in their estimate of men
when placed in untried positions. Even an Emperor was
pronounced " Capax - imprii, nisi impe-asset; " but such
instances are exceptional.
len do not change their character
by putting on the ermine.
It is my conviction, and I wish that every other citizen had
the same conviction, that a learned, efficient and independent
judiciary cannot be obtained through popular suffrage and
short terms of office. Experience is our great teacher. We
have two systems side by side, the Federal and the State;
the former placing on the bench judges appointed by the executive, endowed with office during good behavior, and with
salaries that cannot be lessened ; the latter lifting to the seats
of justice, judges nominated and chosen for the most part by
popular vote, holding for short terms and too often provided
with salaries meager at best and changeable at the will of the
Legislature. Which of the two systems do those who are
forced into the courts most prefer? Into which do suitors
most seek entrance, and how often do those who are sued
desire to have their cases transferred thereto ?
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As to excess in legislation: we all know it, we all feel it,
and look upon it with dismay. One supposed remedy has
been adopted in many of the states, requiring its Legislature
to meet once in two years. That, I fear, will prove a broken
reed. There is no true remedy but in restraining the scope of
legislative power, supplemented by self-restraining legislators.
Look at the piles of statutes which issue yearly from the halls
of our assemblies ; often dozens or more on the same general
subject. In a manual or red-book, printed last year in New
York, a short biography was given of many of the members,
and it was frequently mentioned as matter of commendation
that the member had introduced such and such a bill. Greater
would have been the reason for commendation if it had been
recorded in his favor that he had prevented the enactment of
such and such a bill.
A Federal Congress and forty-two State Assemblies, filled
with members mostly new to legislation, but all seeking to
distinguish themselves by some change in the laws, present a
spectacle appalling to the citizen. Whoever shall devise and
bring to pass an adequate measure of relief will be a benefactor of his country.
David Dudley Field.
June
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